In Djibouti, some men who present themselves as the ‘Head of a Gondola’ – in other words, the most visible showcase – of an opposition that has become skeletal occupy the space through repeated diatribes: anti-IOG on principle, populist by reflex, tribal by calculation. Since they have not built an alternative model that is quantified, testable and credible, they tirelessly describe the extent of Djiboutian ills without ever saying how to get out of them. When this register is exhausted in the country, they turn their arrows back towards the inhabitants of Somalia and seek to capture the sympathy of the Somali diaspora, presenting the alpha and omega of the «misfortunes» of Djibouti as belonging to a face somewhere between regional and clan cleavages. Does this strategy advance the cause of responsible alternation? Nothing is less certain.

1) The background: a locked system… and an opposition that has shrunk

Since 1999, Djibouti has been led by Ismail Omar Guelleh (IOG). Systematically re-elected, he presides over a system where the ruling coalition – the Union for the Presidential Majority (UMP) – dominates political life, while the space for expression of counter-powers is constrained. The recent work of Freedom House describes a landscape in which pluralism formally exists, but where opposition, journalists and critical activists are under recurrent pressure. This structural asymmetry partly explains the weakening and fragmentation of legal opposition. (Freedom House)

The episode of the legislative elections on February 24, 2023, reveals most of the opposition parties boycotted the election, leaving the UMP garnering 58 seats out of 65, with the only opposition party admitted in the race, the UDJ. The decision to boycott – assumed in the name of a denunciation of the rules of the game – mechanically reduced the opposition’s ability to defend ideas in Parliament and to prowl at the exercise of the proposal. It is a political choice fraught with consequences: escaping the electoral arena can preserve the purity of a speech but deprives an institutional platform and programmatic learning. (Idea)

To this constraint are added well-documented media obstacles: part of the printing and distribution infrastructures are still under state control, and self-censorship is still a professional reflex in editorial departments. However, the less pluralist the media space, the more oppositions – when they exist – are tempted by verbal exaggeration to exist. (State Department)

2) ‘Head of a Gondola »: the policy under display

To speak of ‘Candolle’s head ’ is, at bottom, tantamount to summoning the market metaphor of the ‘head of a gondola’: an end-of-shelf display designed to catch the eye and maximize the purchase impulse. Transposed to politics, the ‘Head of a Gondola’ refers to these figures put forward to capture attention, often at the expense of substance. When the programmatic offer is meager, the temptation is great to invest all the effort in visibility – clips, short sentences, viral indignations. It’s effective in the short term; it doesn’t edify anything in the long term. (Linternaute.com)

3) « Paper tigers »? When the striking force is just a noise

The term ‘paper tiger’ refers to something that seems threatening but is harmless. Popularized in the 20th century, the formula recalls that a thundering posture can mask strategic weakness. A part of the Djiboutian opposition seems to be trapped in this trap: roar louder to appear stronger. Yet the din does not replace rooting, nor the method, nor the numbers. (Wikipedia)

 

4) The three temptations of the « zero responsibility » discourse

a) The populism reflex offers simple answers to complex problems: it opposes « the people » to « elites », promises instant solutions, and transforms every disagreement into evidence of conspiracy. This register appeals in times of frustration, but it impoverishes public conversation: we point out culprits, we do not build policies.

b) The tribal slope

 Reducing economic, social and administrative issues to clan-based fault lines is a dangerous facility. It essentializes multiple identities, prevents project coalitions and sets up a logic of generalized suspicion. Social sciences have largely shown, in the Horn of Africa and beyond, that the mechanical invocation of ‘clan’ is becoming a wooden language replacing argumentation. (AIEP Editor)

c) The litany of misfortunes

Describe the problems – unemployment, prices, public services, governance – is not proposed. Hammering the gravity of ‘misfortunes’ can mobilize, but, without costing, phasing, and budgetary arbitrations, the discourse stays performative and non-operative. In a Parliament deserted by the boycotting opposition and a constrained media space, this litany becomes a program substitute. (Idea)

5) The detour through Somalia: diaspora, networks and optical illusions

In the absence of internal political gains, some Djiboutian opponents move the theatre of persuasion: they seek to rally segments of the Somali diaspora by reversing their anti-IOG discourse into a narrative intended for Somali audiences, sometimes at the price of amalgam on the inhabitants of Somalia. The idea is simple: to capture digital relays, community resonance boxes and, sometimes, resources.

The calculation is based on real data: the Somali diaspora is transnational, connected, and weighs by transfers and networks. Academic works highlight its role in the economic and political fields, the extent of remittances, and the centrality of diasporic sociability in mobilizations. But this diasporic capital is first turned towards Somalia itself and does not mechanically obey alignments imported from Djibouti. Wanting to « sell » a Djiboutian antagonism in Somali packaging is often a short-term communication strategy, rarely a long-term coalition strategy. (ETH Zurich Files)

Moreover, the political histories of Djibouti and Somalia, although intertwined (peace processes, mediations, neighborhoods), are neither interchangeable nor superposable: audiences, rules, and incentives differ. Using one to instrumentalize the other, by fanning grievances, exposes a backlash: cross-border polarization does not resolve the programmatic deficits in Djibouti. (AMISOM AU)

6) What an « alternative program » should do – and that outbid speech does not

A true work-study project is neither a watchword (« clear ») nor an inventory of grievances. He must propose, encrypt, prioritize, sequence, and test– five verbs that separate the responsible policy from the show policy.

1.   Proposal

Define clear aims in 100 days, 2 years, 5 years.

Name simple indicators (cost of living, access to water, schooling, administrative issuance times) and target thresholds.

2.   Encrypt

Evaluate the cost of measures (targeted subsidies, organization investments, urban renewal).

Find sources of financing: budgetary redeployments, parafiscal revenues, public-private partnerships (PPPs), multilateral fundraising.

3.   Prioritize

Prioritize: not everything can be first. A good program cuts between the « desirable » and the « possible ».

• Sequencing
  
  

Organize reforms in waves: quick wins (immediate and visible impact measures), structuring projects (energy, ports, logistical corridors), substantive reforms (governance, administrative justice).

5.   Tester / challenger

Submit the measures to contradictory criticism (economists, lawyers, trade unions, local authorities), publish hypotheses, and agree to amend.

Yet populist and tribal rhetoric diverts energy from these demands. The more we occupy the stage through invective, the less ability is mobilized. It is the opposite of serious opposition work.

7) Why the opposition trapped itself

The boycott is an educational impasse.

By abandoning the 2023 legislative elections, the main opposition deprived itself of a public policy workshop. Where do we build an alternative policy, if not in the committees, the hearings, the confrontation of texts? By dint of deserting the enclosure where one numbers and fines, one forgets the grammar of the law. (Wiley Online Library)

Depending on ‘attention’

In the absence of being able to govern, some wanted to ‘rule’ over the attention, this crude oil of the digital age. The ‘end of the aisle’ becomes a role: to be constantly at the end of the beam, to create buzz, even if it means substituting the slogan for the impact card.

The underestimation of media constraints.

In an environment where access to print and broadcast platforms is limited or risky, hyperbole appears as the only amplifier available. But the megaphone does not make a planner. (State Department)

The risky bet on diasporas.

You can win ‘likes’ in London, Oslo or Minneapolis; the majority are not being built in Balbala, Tadjourah and Obock. Electoral geography and the administrative calendar are not decided in the salons of the diaspora; however influential they may be in other battles. (ETH Zurich Files)

8) Can legitimate anger be turned into a credible program?

Yes, on three conditions.

(1) Deradicalize language without watering down goals.

One can firmly and precisely denounce practices (opacity, favoritism, inefficiencies) without essentializing groups or insulting people. To abandon invective is to force the adversary to respond to substance, not to take refuge in moral indignation.

(2) Return to the evidence policy

A serious program publishes its data, sources and methods: how much is the reduction of tax cost? What is the expected impact on the basket of the typical household? What management savings? What deadlines? Many oppositions win not by shouting louder, but by showing better.

(3) Do the « dirty work » of the coalition.

An apprenticeship in Djibouti requires going beyond the affinities of device (UDJ, MRD, ARD, etc.) to compose a minimal and intelligible common base. Historical coalitions (USN) existed but often cracked under the effect of internal rivalries. This political engineering work is thankless, but it is he who transforms visibility into viability.

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9) Outline, for the record, an alternative roadmap (example of method)

Without claiming to be exhaustive, here is what would make a program framework stronger – the kind of document one expects from a responsible opposition:

1. Targeted purchasing power (12 months)
   
   
   1. Establish an anti-inflation basket negotiated on 12 basic products, offset by a tax credit for small distributors.
      
      
   1. Temporarily subsidize the delivery of water to the most fragile areas, with leakage and performance indicators.
      
      
2. Transparency and services (18 months)
   
   
   1. Launch an open budget data portal (all expenses above a threshold published within 30 days).
      
      
   1. Reduce by 50% the delivery times of 10 administrative documents (passport, permit, civil status documents) via one-stop shops.
      
      
3. Planning and growth (24–36 months)
   
   
   1. Independent audit of port costs and bottlenecks in the corridors towards Ethiopia, with phased efficiency plan (investments, digitalization, customs).
      
      
   1. SME-Export Program: partial guarantee window and e-trade training for 500 local enterprises.
      
      
4. Youth and skills (24 months)
   
   
   1. Apprenticeship scholarships (12,000 DJF/month) for 5,000 young people in port professions, construction, energy and digital, co-financed with operators.
      
      
5. Governance (ongoing)
   
   
   1. Annual publication of a 50-page independent evaluation report on program implementation, including public hearings.
      
      

Such a canvas – encrypted, public, auditable – forces the conversation to move away from insults towards arbitrations. It is this type of architecture that we expect from ‘gondolas’ worthy of the name.

10) The trap of cross-border amalgams

Instrumentalizing the Somali neighbor to explain all the ‘misfortunes’ of Djibouti is an intellectual laziness as much as a political risk. Yes, Djibouti and Somalia share human, commercial, and political circulations; yes, Djibouti has been involved in mediations over the years; no, this does not justify turning the inhabitants of Somalia into scapegoats for a narrative intended to flatter diasporic audiences. Political responsibility consists in separating the analysis of regional interdependencies – indispensable – from the temptation of the useful enemy – dangerous. (AMISOM AU)

11) The responsibilities are shared – and that is precisely why it is necessary to better oppose

Recalling the locked nature of the Djiboutian system does not absolve the opposition of its own shortcomings. International reports – Freedom House, electoral databases, human rights reports – set up a constrained context. But between a restrictive context and a counter-productive strategy, there is a world. An opposition that refuses to equip itself (ability, costing, arbitrations) betrays its audience. She confounds reality in convincing, accusing, proposing, describing, and transforming. (   Freedom House)

12) By way of conclusion: from the din to the value

Political history shows that the « gondolas » that last are those that transform attention into public value: solutions that stay in touch with reality, fit into budgets and are evaluated over time. The others stay paper tigers: impressive in the moment, harmless to change.

The criticism of IOG can be firm. She doesn’t have to be hateful. The diagnosis of difficulties can be rigorous. It is not intended to repeat again without leading to a credible offer. Responsibility – the one that distinguishes politics from controversy – requires three simple gestures: describe, deliberate, decide. When the Djiboutian opposition knows how to link them in a public document with figures, invites its opponents to « challenge » him, and agrees to correct their blind spots, it will stop being a noisy showcase and become a workable alternative.

Sources cited (selection)

• Freedom House, Freedom in the World – Djibouti (2024 and 2025): domination of the UMP, constraints on the opposition, IOG in power since 1999. (Freedom House)
  
  
• IDEA & IPU Parline, results of the legislative elections of February 24, 2023: boycott, 58/65 seats for the UMP, 7 for the UDJ. ( Idea)
  
  
• U.S. Department of State, Djibouti 2024 Human Rights Report: constraints medieties, auto censure. (State Department)
  
  
• Definition of ‘shelf top’ (display case, end-of-shelf display). (Linternaute.com)
  
  
• Definition of « paper tiger ». (Wikipedia)
  
  
• Work on the Somali diaspora and its forms of transnational engagement. ( ETH Zurich Files)
  
  
• AMISOM/AU, reminder of the «Djibouti process» in the Somali peace cycles. ( AMISOM AU)